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I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T 
0 F T H E 
S T A T E 0 F U T A H 
GENEVA OTERO and the 
STATE OF UTAH, by and 
through Utah State 
Department of Social 
Services, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents,; 
vs. 
JOE WILLIAMS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLAHT 
I 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 16819 
This action sought a determination of paternity, 
( 
a judgment for past welfare support paid for the minor 
child of the parties by the State of Utah, and an order 
for on-going and future support for the child pursuant 
to the provisions of U.C.A., §78-45a-l (1953), as amended. 
The Defendant voluntarily acknowledged paternity of the 
child in question. Based thereon, the Plaintiffs moved 
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the lower Court for a Sunnnary Judgment as to the issue of 
back support. A judgment was granted in favor of 
Plaintiff for the welfare support previously paid by 
the State of Utah. 
Defendant has appealed from that money judgment. 
II 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment was 
heard on November 14, 1979. After oral arguments, 
the Court below granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and awarded Plaintiffs a judgment in the amount 
of Four Thousand One Hundred Seventy-nine and 67/100 
Dollars ($4,179.67) for past welfare support paid. Said 
judgment was timely appealed by Defendant-Appellant herein. 
III 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment 
below and a determination that as a matter of law an 
indigent father is not liable for welfare payments made 
for the support of his child by the State of Utah. 
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IV 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This paternity action was filed in the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County initially 
seeking a determination of paternity, a judgment for 
amounts paid by the State of Utah for support of the child, 
born March 30, 1978, and a continuing order for future 
support pursuant to U.C.A., §78-45a-l et. seq. (1953). 
The Defendant acknowledged paternity of the 
child in question by Stipulation. Plaintiffs filed 
a Motion for Summary Judgment based on Defendant's 
acknowledgment. Defendant opposed Plaintiffs' Motion 
establishing that he had been indigent at the time 
of the child's birth and at all times since, and contending 
that he should therefore not be held liable for the support 
payment made by the State of Utah. 
Upon oral Stipulation of the parties in open 
court, the factual allegations of Plaintiffs' Complaint 
as to we.lfare amounts paid were admitted. The lower Court 
heard Plaintiffs' Motion for Surrnnary Judgment on November 
14, 1979. In an Order dated December 3, 1979, the 
Court below granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Sunmiary Judgment 
and entered a money judgment for past support. 
The Defendant filed a timely Notice of Appeal 
from the Summary Judgment. 
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v 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 30, 1978, the co-Plaintiff, Geneva 
Otero, gave birth out of wedlock to a female child, Elisha 
Miera (R.30). At the time of co-Plaintiff Otero's pregnancy 
and confinement, she was receiving public assistance from 
the State of Utah. She continued to receive public 
assistance payments from the State of Utah for the child 
from April, 1978 through September, 1979. In all, Plaintiff 
Ctero incurred Nine Hundred Eighteen Dollars and 67 /100 
($918. 67) in benefits for medical expenses related to 
the birth of the child and Three Thousand Two Hundred 
Sixty-one Dollars ($3,261.00) in monthly benefits for the 
child's support from April, 1978 through September, 1979. 
(R. 37) 
The child in question was killed in an 
automobile accident in September, 1979. The matter of 
on-going future support is therefore not in issue. 
Prior to the child's birth, the Defendant was 
arrested and incarcerated in the Salt Lake County Jail 
(R. 22). He was held continuously in the jail until 
April 2, 1979 when he was transfered to the Utah State 
Prison where he is still confined (R. 22). During his 
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incarceration in the jail from March 30, 1978 to 
April 2, 1979, the Defendant had no income from any 
source whatsoever (R. 22). From the time of his transfer 
to the Utah State Prison on April 2, 1979 until the present, 
the Defendant's income has never exceeded Twenty Dollars 
($20.00) per month (R. 23). The Defendant's present 
worldly assets are items of clothing and personal property 
with him at the Utah State Prison having a value of less 
than Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) (R. 27). 
The Defendant adknowledged paternity of the 
child. The Defendant argued below that, owing to his 
extreme poverty during all the time the State of Utah 
paid support for the child, he should not be obligated to 
re-imburse the State of Utah for support payments made. 
VI 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
WHERE THE STATE PROVIDES SUPPORT FOR 
A CHILD OF INDIGENT PARENTS, THE FATHER 
SHOULD NOT BE OBLIGATED TO RE-IMBURSE 
THE STATE. 
The applicable statute in the instant case is 
U.C.A. §78-45-7 (1953) which provides as follows: 
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' 78-45-7. Determination of amount of support.--
(1) Prospective support shall be equal to 
the amount granted by prior court order 
unless there has been a material change 
of circumstance on the part of the obliger 
or obligee. 
(2) When no prior court order exists, or a 
material change in circumstances has 
occurred, the court in determining the 
amount of prospective support, shall 
consider all relevant factors including 
but not limited to: 
(a) the standard of living and situation 
of the parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income 
of the parties; 
(c) the ability of the obliger to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the need of the obligee; 
(f) the age of the parties; 
(g) the responsiblity of the obliger 
for the support of others. 
(3) When no prior court order exists, the 
court shall determine and assess all arrearages 
based upon, but not limited to: 
(a) the amount of public assistance 
received by the obligee, if any; 
(b) the funds that have been reasonably 
and necessarily expended in support 
of spouse and children. 
U.C.A., §78-45-7 (3), (1953), provides two express 
criteria to be used in determining support arrear ages. These 
are: (1) the amount of public assistance received by the 
obligee; and (2) the amount reasonably and necessarily 
expended in support of spouse and children. The statute does 
not preclude the consideration of other factors. 
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The lower court interpreted the statute as 
dictating that the first criteria was the only criteria 
which need be used in determining the amount of support 
arrearages. The lower court did not receive any evidence 
as to the reasonableness of the funds expended, pursuant 
to U.C.A. §78-45-7 (3) (b), and the lower court ignored 
the prefatory clause of U.C.A., §78-45-7 (3), (1953), 
which provides: 
Where no prior court order exists, the 
court shall determine and assess all 
arrearages based upon, but not limited 
to: ... (emphasis added) 
By the language "not limited to" in U.C.A., §78-45-7(3), 
(1953), the legislature demonstrated its intent that other 
criteria should be reviewed by the Court in its equitable 
discretion. 
An additional criteria which must be judicially 
incorporated into U.C.A., §78-45-7 (3), (1953), is 
the financial capacity of the obliger/defendant to pay 
support to the obligee, both during the time support is 
provided by the State and at the time of judgment. The 
legislature expressed the policy that no one should be 
legally obligated to pay an amount of support beyond his 
or her financial means by specifically listing ability to 
~ as a criteria for determining the amount of on-going 
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support pursuant to U.C.A., §78-45-7 (2), (1953). That 
subsection requires that the poverty or wealth of the 
obliger must be considered in determining support obligations,: 
The statute requires the Court to consider the standard of I 
living of the parties, the relative wealth and income of 
the partes, and the ability of the obliger to earn, in 
fixing the amount of a prospective support obligation. 
It is illogical to assume that the legislature required 
these elements to be ignored when determining arrearages 
for support where no prior order for support exists. The 
legislature provided that the criteria to be used in determini1tl 
support arrearages are not limited to those expressly 
stated in U.C.A., §78-45-7 (3), (1953), indicating that 
other criteria such as those listed in the proceeding 
subsection should be considered. 
Ability to pay must be a criteria for assessing 
support arrearages by virtue of prior court decision. This 
court has previously held that the principal consideration 
in making determinations of child support are the needs 
of the child and the ability of the parents to provide 
support. Forbush v. Forbush, 578 P2d 518 (Utah, 1978). 
These Court enunciated considerations should be incorporated 
into U.C.A., §78-45-7 (3) when determining an obliger's 
liability for past support. 
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The uncontroverted affidavits of the D~fendant 
in this case prove that he lacked the ability to pay 
support or to earn money during the time the State of 
Utah supported the child and that he lacked the ability, 
the resources, or the assets to pay the arrearages at 
the time judgment was entered against him. Pursuant to 
U.C.A. §78-45-7 (1953), the financial capacity of an 
obliger to pay support must be considered in determining 
support arrearages, and the Defendant, because of his 
extreme poverty, should not be required to re-imburse 
the State of Utah for past support paid. 
Point II 
THE TIME WHEN AN ACTION FOR SUPPORT 
ARREARAGES IS COMMENCED SHOULD NOT 
BE DETERMINATIVE OF AN OBLIGOR'S 
LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT, OF THE CRITERIA 
FOR DETERMINING LIABILITY, OR OF THE 
AMOUNT OF SUPPORT. 
The Plaintiffs argued and the Court below found 
that the ability of an obliger to pay support is an 
appropriate factor to consider only in determining the 
amount of on-going support. In effect, Plaintiffs and the 
lower court have concluded that if there were a question 
of Defendant's liability for on-going support, the issue 
of his poverty would become relevant pursuant to U.C.A., 
§78-45-7 (2)' (1953). 
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~he present action for child support could 
have been brought at any time after Plaintiff Otero 
conceived. If this action had been brought prior to 
the child's birth, and if Defendant had acknowledged 
paternity at or before birth, the court below would have 
considered only Defendant's obligation for on-going 
support, since no support arrearages would have accrued. 
The lower court then would have determined Defendant's 
liability based on the criteria set forth in U.C.A., 
§78-45-7 (2), (1953), including Defendant's wealth (or 
lack thereof) and ability to earn. Instead, this action 
for support was brought only after substantial arrearages 
had accrued. The judgment was obtained months later 
after still more arrearages had accrued. When the support 
at issue became arrearages rather than future support, 
the lower court found that the criteria of Subsection (2) 
(wealth, earning ability, etc.) were no longer to be 
considered in determining Defendant's liability. The lower 
court determined Defendant's arrear ages based soley on the 
express criteria of U.C.A., §78-45-7 (3), and found that 
Defendant's poverty could not be considered in imposing 
liability for support arrearages. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
The .time at which an action is brought should 
not be determinative of the outcome of the action. Not 
one relevant factor changed during the course of the instant 
case. The Defendant remained incapable of providing 
support, the minor rihild continued to be in need of 
support, and the State of Utah continued to pay support 
for the benefit of the child in need. Yet, the Court 
below has found that mere passage of time, the mere 
changing of support from a future event to a past event, 
has somehow made it improper to consider Defendant's 
poverty in determining his liability for support. 
If the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment 
based on Defendant's acknowledgment of paternity had come 
on for hearing at the time of the child's birth, the 
lower Court would have been required to consider the factors 
outlined in U.C.A., §78-45-7 (2), (1953). It is 
inequitable not to consider those elements in the instant 
case simply because the issue has become one of arrearages. 
The Court is not limited to consideration of 
the criteria expressly mentioned in U.C.A., §78-45-7 (3), 
(1953), in determining Defendants liability. The Court must 
also consider the criteria of U.C.A., §78-45-7 (2), (1953), 
since these are the same criteria which would have been 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
considered had the action been brought earlier. In 
light of the Defendant's extreme poverty, the Defendant 
should not be liable to the State of Utah for past support 
paid. 
Point III 
THE STATE SHOULD NOT IMPOSE A SUPPORT 
OBLIGATION ON A·PARENT WHICH IS FAR 
IN EXCESS OF THE PARENT'S ABILITY TO 
PAY SUPPORT. 
It is not the policy of the State of Utah to 
impose child support obligations on a parent in excess of 
the parent's ability to pay. This is demonstrated by the 
criteria listed in U.C.A., §78-45-7 (2), (1953), which 
require that a parent's wealth or poverty, standard of 
living, and ability td earn be considered in fixing support 
obligations. Moreover, the Utah State Legislature has 
recognized that there are some circumstances under which 
adults are incapable of supporting themselves and/or their 
children. The legislature has provided for these circumstance.,: 
by creating a program for public assistance in Utah U. C.A., 
§55-15a-l, (1953) et. seq. U.C.A. §55-15a-l, (1953) states 
the purpose of the public assistance act as follows: 
It is the purpose of this act to 
provide assistance to any person 
in Utah in n~ed. A person is in 
need and entitled to assistance 
if sufficient resources are not 
available for his use within the 
limitations set forth herein and 
who otherwise qualifies. 
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The existance of the public assistance program acknowledges 
that some people need financial help. This State will 
assist its citizens when its citizens cannot assist themselves. 
The Defendant in this case has proved his extremely 
impoverished condition through two uncontroverted affidavits 
submitted to the Court below. It would be a violation of 
the intent expressed in U.C.A., §78-45-7 (2), (1953), to 
impose any obligation for support, either past or future, 
on a man who literally is not and never has been able to 
pay. It would contradict the policy of public assistance 
in this State to impose an obligation for past support on 
the Defendant. The situations and circumstances of all 
the parties in this case are exactly the circumstances and 
situations which the public assistance program was designed 
to take care of. The Defendant was not able to support the 
child from the time of her birth until the time of her 
death and he is still not able to re-imburse the State 
' 
which supported the child. Since the Plaintiff Otero 
qualified for and received public assistance for herself 
and the child, it can be presumed that she was also incapable 
of supporting her child during the time in question. The 
child could not support herself. Since no one with a duty 
to support the child could do so, the State of Utah, in 
keeping with its policy of aiding its indigent citizens, 
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supported the child. It would be incongruent if the State 
of Utah were now permitted to go against the indigent 
Defendant father for support monies paid. 
It would be arbitrary and unreasonable to impose 
a duty on the Defendant beyond his ability. When the law 
imposes an obligation on a person beyond that person's 
ability to meet that obligation, when the law requires a 
higher standard of performance than a person is capable 
of giving, it.fosters disregard for the law. No citizen 
will respect the law when the law expects him to do what 
he simply cannot do. 
The Court should not impose a duty· on the Defendant ;i 
to pay what he could not and can not pay. Such a ruling 
would only cause disrespect and distrust of our laws and 
legal processes. 
Point IV 
THE PLAINTIFF OTERO MUST SHARE THE BURDEN 
OF SUPPORT FOR THE CHILD. 
The State of Utah imposes an equal duty on both 
parents to support their children. A mother has a duty 
to support her minor child equal to a father's duty to 
support his minor child U.C.A., §78-45-3 and 4, (1953). 
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In this case, the co-Plaintiff Otero had a legal 
duty to support her daughter. She shirked this duty by 
failin·g to provide support, and the State of Utah provided 
that support instead. It can be argued that co-Plaintiff 
Otero was too poor to support her child, and that this fact 
should relieve her duty of support and should also relieve 
her of any obligation to re-imburse the State for support 
monies paid. Since the Plaintiff State of Utah apparently 
has not attempted to obtain a judgment against co-Plaintiff 
Otero for past support paid for the child, it can be assumed 
that this is the position adopted by Plaintiffs, and tacitly 
adopted by the lower Court. 
However, the argument applies equally as well 
to Defendant. He could not support the child, so the 
State of Utah supported her instead. Defendant was in just 
as dire a financial condition as Plaintiff Otero when the 
State performed his support duty. In fact, since Plaintiff 
Otero was free to seek gainful employment while Defendant 
was incarcerated during the time in question, Plaintiff 
Otero was in a better position to support her daughter than 
was the Defendant. The same theory which renders co-Plaintiff 
Otero not liable to re-imburse the State for past support 
paid should also relieve the Defendant of the same obligation. 
Payment of child support by a non-custodial parent is not 
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to be a payment of all amounts needed to support a child. 
The custodial parent has an obligation to provide some 
financial assistance for the benefit of the child as well 
as providing the emotional and nuturing needs of the child. 
To say simply by rote that a non-custodial parent 
must re-imburse the State for all assistance payments made 
denies the mutual obligations of parents to support their 
child. The Complaint asks that the Defendant alone be 
ordered and obligated to re-imburse the State for the monthly 
grant of public assistance. It would be inequitable to 
grant Plaintiffs a judgment against Defendant under the 
instant facts when both Defendant and Plaintiff Otero had 
a duty to support their child, when both of them failed to 
perform that duty out of poverty, and when the State of 
Utah stepped in to perform that duty instead. 
Point V 
THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT MANDATES 
UNJUST AND UNREASONABLE RESULTS IN FUTURE 
CASES. 
The decision of the Court below mandates extremely 
inequitable results. For example, suppose two seriously 
physically handicapped people incapable of ever working were 
to marry and have a child. Suppose the wife were then to 
desert the husband, but not seek a divorce, and live seperatel·: 
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from the husband and child. Suppose the State of Utah 
then paid public assistance to support the father, the 
child, and the mother. Under the decision of the lower 
court, the State of Utah could sue the mother two years 
or five years later for all support monies paid for the 
child over the period. According to the Court below, 
it would be inappropriate to consider the standard of 
living, wealth, or ability to earn of the mother. All 
that could be considered would be the amount of support 
arrearages paid by the State. 
The decision of the lower Court that a Court 
may not consider the financial circumstances of a non-custodial 
parent in determining the amount owed for support arrearages 
where no prior order for support exists mandates unreasonable 
and inequitable results. For this reason, the judgment of 
the Court below should be vacated. 
VIII 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiffs have obtained a judgment against 
Defendant for past support paid by the State of Utah. This 
judgment should be vacated and a judgment entered that 
Defendant is underalegal obligation to re-imburse the 
Plaintiffs for past support paid only in accordance with 
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his current and past ability to pay. The new judgment should 
further provide that since the Defendant had no ability to 
pay at the time in question, he has no legal duty to re-
imburse the State for past support paid. 
Defendant should be granted such relief because 
of his extreme poverty during the time support was paid 
f' 
and at the time of judgment. The Defendant's indigency 
should be considered as the controlling factor in determining 
the amount of back support owed pursuant to U.C.A., 
§78-45-7 (3), (1953). The criteria listed in U.C.A., 
§78-45-7 (2), (1953) should be considered since they 
would have been controlling had the instant action been 
brought at the time Defendant's support obligation first 
arose. 
Plaintiffs should not be granted a judgment against 
Defendant for past support paid, since it would be un-
reasonable to expect persons to support themselves or 
others when they are not capable of doing so, as expressed 
in U.C.A., §78-45-7 (2), (1953), and as expressed by the 
existence of the public assistance program in Utah. It is 
arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable to require Defendant 
to do what he cannot and has not been able to do. 
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It is inequitable to grant Plaintiffs a judgment 
for all past support paid against Defendant when both Plaintiff 
Otero and Defendant were under an equal duty to support their 
child and both were unable to perform that duty owing to 
their poverty. 
The decision of the lower Court mandates unreasonable 
results. Plaintiff's judgment should be vacated, and a 
determination made that the Defendant is liable for arrearages 
only to the extent of his ability to pay. 
Res~ctfully subm_itted, 
,/ ~ ~) 
__ / /} =~'7- ,-~>~/-/ ,/ 
------· --·------- ~. - /~~---.:~ ·~ /-____ _/ .:· 
BRIAN M. BARNARD 
Attorney for Defendant-
Appellant 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
~/?Cz;y (' (7~._,:_:,, 
/ . 
MARY C~ CORPOROH 
Third Year Law Student for 
Defendant-Appellant 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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